In the tense days following General Sani Abacha’s sudden death on June 8, 1998, Nigeria stood on the edge of a precipice. The military was divided. Hardliners smelled opportunity. Pro-democracy forces were watching with suspicion. One man — General Abdulsalami Abubakar — suddenly found himself at the centre of a high-wire political drama with the future of the nation hanging in the balance.
In his autobiography Call of Duty, Abdulsalami reveals the intense internal debates and the perilous choices he had to make. What he did next would determine whether Nigeria slid back into prolonged military rule or finally stepped into democracy.
The Dangerous Options on the Table
Abdulsalami was confronted with three major paths — each carrying heavy risks:
Option 1: Continue Abacha’s Flawed Transition Programme
This would have meant organising quick elections under the five controversial political parties Abacha had created (famously described by Chief Bola Ige as “the five fingers of a leprous hand”). Handover would have happened by October 1, 1998. But the parties lacked credibility, were seen as Abacha’s puppets, and excluded key pro-democracy figures, especially from the South-West. Abdulsalami knew this route would trigger fresh crisis and deepen national division.
Option 2: Start All Over Again — The Hawks’ Favourite
Discard everything and begin a fresh constitutional conference, public debate, and new transition timetable. This “clean slate” approach could easily keep the military in power for another three years. For military hawks who had tasted power and were reluctant to leave, this was the preferred option. It would buy time, allow new constitution drafting, and potentially entrench military rule even longer. Abdulsalami saw the danger clearly: the longer the military stayed, the higher the risk of another coup by officers unwilling to relinquish control.
Option 3: Adopt the 1979 Constitution with Amendments
After nationwide consultations led by the Constitution Debate Co-ordinating Committee (chaired by Justice Niki Tobi), Nigerians overwhelmingly favoured returning to the 1979 Constitution with relevant updates from the 1995 draft. This was the middle path — pragmatic, faster, and less likely to ignite fresh political explosions.
The Edge-of-the-Seat Decision
Abdulsalami later confessed that adopting the 1979 Constitution came as a “welcome relief.” He feared that forcing the controversial 1995 draft (which included radical ideas like multiple Vice-Presidents) would be rejected by Afenifere/NADECO forces and plunge the country into another round of crisis.
He also rejected ideas like a Government of National Unity (GNU) without elections, calling it a recycled failure similar to the short-lived Interim National Government of 1993. Proposals for a sovereign national conference or regional armies were dismissed outright — Abdulsalami, a Civil War veteran, was determined to preserve Nigeria’s unity.
His reasoning was both strategic and moral:
“The longer the Military stayed in power after Abacha’s death, the bleaker the prospects of a genuine transition to democracy would be… I could not even rule out the possibility of a coup along the line by officers who did not want the Military to quit. For me, the earlier we left, the better for the democratisation project.”
The Historic Outcome
By choosing speed and pragmatism over perfection, Abdulsalami Abubakar pulled off what many thought impossible. In just 11 months, he stabilised the country, released political prisoners, liberalised the political space, and handed over power to a civilian government on May 29, 1999 — ending 16 years of unbroken military rule and birthing Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
His decision to ward off the military hawks by adopting the 1979 Constitution with amendments proved to be one of the most consequential choices in Nigeria’s modern history. It was not perfect, but it prevented what could have been another cycle of coups, instability, and authoritarian entrenchment.
In the end, Abdulsalami chose country over personal power — and Nigeria took its first shaky but decisive step toward sustained democracy.
Source: General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s autobiography Call of Duty.
What do you think? Was Abdulsalami’s decision to go with the 1979 Constitution a masterstroke of pragmatism, or did it leave too many foundational issues unresolved? Share your thoughts in the comment section.
